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Abstract 
 
Precaution is regarded as the paradigmatic approach to uncertainty. Either 
proposed as a form of radical prevention or, as put forward recently, as an 
innovative normative procedure to handle uncertainties in advancing human 
activities, it nevertheless finds its source in Cold War research dealing with 
the uncertainties of a potential nuclear war. The work of Herman Kahn and 
the Club of Rome in its first report The Limits to Growth are shown to be 
exemplary in understanding the present 21st century discussion on pre-
caution. Two themes specifically emerge in the discussion about precaution, 
which includes two examples: the shift from the scientific aim of securing 
objective knowledge (which we will specify in due course) towards 
acceptability and the exigency to manage uncertainty. Both themes are 
closely related. In the final analysis we will see that neither acceptability nor 
the management of uncertainty, respectively, is acceptable or attainable. 
Precaution will render nothing within the confines within which it is 
regarded to function. 
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1 Introducing precaution 
 
The can things with the sharp little edges/That can cut your fingers when you’re not 
looking/The soft little things on the floor that you step on/They can all be 
DANGEROUS.  
 
As the lyrics of The Dangerous Kitchen by Frank Zappa show, one can never 
be too careful. The song has an absurd quality that is not easily missed when 
you actually hear it. The music intensifies the text, until it saturates your mind. 
Whether this song exemplifies a perspective now dominant in our Western 
world culture, we cannot tell. However, precaution, the main theme of this 
issue, is intensely portrayed in Zappa’s lyrics. 
In this contribution I want to critically assess precaution for what I 
believe it is: neither new nor innovative, yet problematical at best and injurious 
at worst. Nevertheless, in their recent report Onzekere Veiligheid, the Dutch 
Scientific Council for Government Policy (Wetenschappelijke Raad voor het 
Regeringsbeleid) suggest a new precautionary paradigm.1 In a few words, the 
WRR posit that precaution expresses alacrity to respond proactively vis-à-vis 
uncertainty considering people’s vulnerability and that of society and the 
natural environment. Thus precaution is not so much a form of radical 
prevention, whereby precaution will only come into its own when the potential 
for serious irreversible damage is suspected, but is regarded as a paradigm shift 
towards the centrality of the vulnerability of the environment and the 
concomitant potential risks of activities.2 This shift highlights the fact that we 
are not so much confronted with risks but with uncertainties that subsequently 
require an adequate translation into potential risks, which in turn need to be 
pursued and managed proactively. If precaution is espoused as normative, 
organisational processes need to be structured in such a way that early warnings 
with regard to uncertainty are integrated into corporate policies. 
Simply put, precaution generates policies that focus on uncertainty. As 
the most widely cited definition of the precautionary principle states: 
 
Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty 
shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent 
environmental degradation.3  
 
This formulation of the precautionary principle is considered the most 
                                                     
1
 Wetenschappelijk Raad voor het Regeringsbeleid (WRR) Onzekere veiligheid. 
Verantwoordelijkheden rond fysieke veiligheid (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University 
Press 2008) [Uncertain Safety. Responsibilities of Physical Safety, Scientific 
Council for Government policy]. 
2
 Id., at 125.  
3
 See <http://www.unep.org/Documents.multilingual/Default.asp?DocumentID=78 
&ArticleID= 1163&l=en> (accessed 9 April 2009). 
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authoritative among the many formulations that can be found nowadays.4 It is 
also known as the triple-negative definition: ‘not having scientific certainty is 
not a justification for not regulating’.5 It can be found in abundance in national 
and international legislation and treaties.6 In view of the many legal experiences 
with precaution, of which we will give two examples shortly, the most widely 
accepted understanding of the precautionary principle, the Rio definition 
included, should be construed in a strong way.7 Concisely, precaution is taken 
to mean that prohibitions should be imposed on activities that have an uncertain 
potential to impose substantial harm, unless those in favour of these activities 
can show that they present no (appreciable) risk.8 This is illustrated most 
poignantly in The Final Declaration of the First European ‘Seas at Risk’ 
Conference Annex I: 
 
The principle of precautionary action requires that: 
1. the lack of scientific certainty regarding cause and effect is not used as a reason for 
deferring measures to prevent harm to the environment. Science, while important 
in providing evidence of effect, is no longer required to provide proof of a causal 
link between pollutant/disturbing activity and effect, and where no clear evidence 
is available one way or the other the environment must be given ‘the benefit of the 
doubt’; 
2. the environmental implications of each and every planned activity are considered 
first – the use of the ‘economic availability’ reservation in the application of 
precautionary measures, e.g., when considering the adoption of clean or cleaner 
technology/production processes, is inconsistent with this, and must be abandoned; 
3. the ‘burden of proof’ is shifted from the regulator to the person or persons 
responsible for the potentially harmful activity, who will now have to demonstrate 
that their actions are not/will not cause harm to the environment; 
                                                     
4
 J.D. Graham, ‘Decision–analytic refinements of the precautionary principle’ 
(2001) 4 Journal of Risk Research 127. 
5
 C.D. Stone, ‘Is there a precautionary principle?’ (2001) Environmental Law 
Reporter 10789. 
6
 A. Trouwborst, Evolution and Status of the Precautionary Principle in 
International Law (The Hague: Kluwer Law International 2002); The Convention on 
Biological Diversity also incorporates a similar definition of the precautionary 
principle, when is mentioned in the preamble that ‘where there is a threat of 
significant reduction or loss of biological diversity, lack of full scientific certainty 
should not be used as a reason for postponing measures to avoid or minimize such a 
threat, …’ See <http://www.biodiv.org/convention/articles.asp?lg=0&a=cbd–00> 
(accessed 9 April 2009). 
7
 R.B. Stewart, ‘Environmental Regulatory Decision Making Under Uncertainty’ in 
T. Swanson (ed.), An Introduction to the Law and Economics of Environmental 
Policy: Issues in Institutional Design (Research in Law and Economics, Volume 20) 
(Leiden: Elsevier 2002) at 71; C.R. Sunstein, ‘Beyond the Precautionary Principle’ 
(2003) Public Law and Legal Theory Working Paper No. 38. This paper can be 
downloaded at <http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=307098> (accessed 9 April 2009). 
8
 Stewart, above n. 7. 
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4. if the ‘worst case scenario’ for a certain activity is serious enough then even a small 
amount of doubt as to the safety of that activity is sufficient to stop it taking place; 
5. potentially harmful activities are avoided where, either public debate has not 
concluded the activity to be a social necessity, or less harmful alternatives exist…. 9 
 
The idea of ‘possible risk’ will be understood to require some sort of threshold 
of (scientific) plausibility. However, under the precautionary principle, the 
threshold burden is minimal, and once it is met, there is something like a 
presumption in favour of stringent regulatory controls. As Douma remarks (the 
perspective that Kahn had on nuclear war springs to mind here):  
 
… The default rule applied in both the EC and the WTO that the burden of proof rests 
with the regulating authorities, obliging them to demonstrate the existence of a risk, 
should be applied in a precautionary manner. The threshold of producing such proof 
should not be set too high .… 10 
 
Conversely, the reversal of the ‘burden of proof’ within the precautionary 
context shifts the explanatory burden of the regulator to the person or persons 
responsible for the potentially harmful activity, who will now have to 
demonstrate that their actions are not causing or will not cause harm to the 
environment and to human health. If the ‘worst case scenario’ for a certain 
activity is serious enough, then even a small amount of doubt as to the safety of 
that activity is sufficient to stop it taking place. Although Douma envisions a 
minimal threshold of proof for regulating authorities, this threshold is set quite 
high for the societal parties −  economic or otherwise − involved, which need to 
present substantial proofs of safety.  As Holmes Rolston III remarks:  
 
Chemicals, unlike persons, are not innocent until proven guilty but suspect until proven 
innocent. So the burden of proof shifts, and it is now up to the industrialists to dispatch 
it. This puts them again on the frontier, technologically and morally .…11 
 
The term ‘continuous assessment’ of science and technology comes to mind 
when one discusses precaution within these terms, necessarily with the aid of 
science and technology. Conversely, the notion that absence of evidence indeed 
is not evidence of absence seems to be running through the precautionary 
debate, regardless of whether it is seen as radical prevention or, in the analysis 
of the WRR, a paradigmatic safeguard for a vulnerable world. It seems then 
                                                     
9
 C.W. Backes and J.M. Verschuuren, ‘The Precautionary Principle in International, 
European, and Dutch Wildlife Law’ (1998) 9 Colorado Journal of International 
Environmental Law & Policy 43. 
10
 W.T. Douma, The Precautionary Principle. Its Application in International, 
European and Dutch Law (The Netherlands: University of Groningen 2003). 
11
 H. Rolston III, Environmental Ethics. Duties to and Ethics in the Natural World. 
(Philadelphia: Temple University Press 1988) at 319. 
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that we need to embrace a precautionary culture, though the term is not used by 
the WRR. This is ironic, since critics of the precautionary principle, of which I 
am one, are reproached for their limitation of the precautionary principle as 
radical prevention, while in fact precautionary culture on a much wider scale 
than that proposed by WRR is extensively assessed and criticised by many.12 
To properly set the wheels of criticism in motion we need to go back 
some 50 odd years, in particular to the RAND project. Here we will show in 
passing that the WRR has unknowingly revived a perspective on life, society, 
and the natural environment that had already been institutionalised during the 
Cold War. The Cold War perspective on the uncertain future came to ‘full 
bloom’ in the 1970s with the first report to The Club of Rome. This backdrop 
gives us at least three threads of the precautionary tale that need to suffice here: 
(i) Cold War cautions and the limits to growth; (ii) examples; (iii) science, risk, 
and precaution. Two themes specifically emerge in a discussion about 
precaution:  the shift from the scientific aim of securing objective knowledge 
(which we will specify anon) towards acceptability ánd the exigency to manage 
uncertainty. Both themes are closely related and will surface subsequently in 
the threads we will follow. In the final analysis we will see that neither 
acceptability nor the management of uncertainty is acceptable or attainable, 
respectively. 
 
 
2 ‘On Thermonuclear War’ and ‘The Limits to Growth’ 
 
Not long after the end of WWII, the world began to worry yet again about war. 
The nuclear age presented itself on the viewing screens of the military and 
citizens alike, with devastating effects. Society as we knew it could be 
obliterated at the push of a button. As a child, I often spotted Lockheed F104 
Starfighters performing their daily routine flights. Their thundering engines 
were awe-inspiring but added to the gloomy and apprehensive atmosphere in 
the Netherlands living under the threat of ‘the bomb’. These fears spawned a 
specific albeit somewhat forgotten ‘scientific response’. Science was now not 
only used to enhance the sophistication of nuclear and non-nuclear weaponry, it 
                                                     
12
 See for example R. Pieterman, ‘Culture in the Risk Society. An Essay on the Rise 
of a Precautionary Culture’ (2001) 22 Zeitschrift für Rechtssoziologie 145; A. 
Burgess, Cellular Phones, Public Fears, and a Culture of Precaution (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press 2003); C.R. Sunstein, Laws of Fear: Beyond the 
Precautionary Principle (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2005); J.C. 
Hanekamp and S.W. Verstegen, ‘The problem of the precautionary principle: the 
paternalism of the precautionary coalition’ in J. Panton and O.M. Hartwich (eds.), 
Science vs superstition. The case for a new scientific enlightenment (Buckingham: 
University of Buckingham Press 2006); R. Pieterman, J.C. Hanekamp and L. 
Bergkamp, ‘Onzekere voorzorg bedreigt rechtszekerheid’ (2006) 81 Nederlands 
Juristenblad 2 [Uncertain precaution threatens legal security]. 
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was used in ways similar to those in contemporary precautionary culture. Risks 
and uncertainties relating to thermonuclear war were tackled with a scientific 
gusto unheard up until then, with risk assessment and management of nuclear 
exchange as key elements therein. 
During WWII, engineers and scientists provided key inventions, such 
as radar and the atomic bomb. Research and development were seen as even 
more important in the battles of the future, which undoubtedly would come. 
The founders of the project Research and Development conceived of RAND as 
a way of retaining and enhancing, for the US Air Force, the considerable 
benefits of civilian scientific thinking. The project got under way officially in 
December 1945, and in March 1946 RAND was launched as a freestanding 
division within the Douglas Aircraft Company of Santa Monica, California. 
This was the genesis of the earliest ‘think tank’.  
 
Operations research, the brainchild conceived in the war years by the young men in the 
Office of Scientific Research and Development (OSRD), evolved in the 1950s into the 
speculative fabrications of systems analysis. RAND was its nursery. It was at RAND that 
the civilian defence intellectual who specialised in systems analysis took form .…13 
 
Herman Kahn was one of the leading researchers at this newly developed 
research institute, and one of the most controversial. Kahn began his career in 
the late 1940s with the RAND Corporation as a physicist and mathematician. 
While working at RAND, his co-directorship of the Strategic Air Force Project 
inspired him to write On Thermonuclear War. Published first in 1960, the study 
simultaneously elevated him to national and international pre-eminence and 
made him the focus of much derision. On Thermonuclear War was the first 
book to analyse systematically the possible effects of nuclear war and the 
possible strategic options under various circumstances. In a later study, he 
expressed his basic investigative approach – which has a very precautionary 
ring to it – to nuclear war as follows: 
 
I can believe the impossible’, Father Brown notes, in one of G.K. Chesterton’s 
wonderful priest-detective stories, ‘but not the improbable’…. Unlike Father Brown, we 
believe not only the impossible and the improbable, but also the implausible, the 
unlikely, and the unproven. We believe in them and we take them seriously, especially 
when they involve what is probably the central issue of our time – nuclear war. 14 
 
In the middle of the 20th century, researchers within the US military, and Kahn 
in particular, tried, with the aid of science, to deal with history before it 
happened. As Ghamari-Tabrizi observes:  
                                                     
13
 S. Ghamari-Tabrizi, The Worlds of Herman Kahn. The Intuitive Science of 
Thermonuclear War (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press 2005). 
14
 H. Kahn, Thinking about the Unthinkable in the 1980s (New York: Simon and 
Schuster 1984). 
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The problem for national security was always the unknown unknowns. How can you 
defend against No Discernable Thing? … [T]his book is precisely about the unknown 
unknowns of national security. It is about how analysts in the Cold War developed 
ways to fill in the ciphers of strategic uncertainty. It explores the peculiarly inventive 
quality of strategy, how uncertainty becomes the wellspring of extravagant threat 
scenarios. However much nuclear war planning – the fighting, termination, and 
survival of it – was presented to the public during the Cold War as a practical question 
for scientific deliberation, war planning could never be a matter of fact. Whether 
humankind could survive a nuclear war could only be resolved with reference to one’s 
own beliefs about the social and natural world. To flesh out a world where clever men 
fashioned Something out of Nothing … I offer a tale about Herman Kahn, a virtuoso of 
the unknown unknowns.15 
 
Assessing risks and trying to frame ‘unknown unknowns’ constituted Kahn’s 
playground, and from the 1960s onwards they were probed increasingly with 
fallible computer models. In On Thermonuclear War Kahn realised that 
uncertainty stalked the strategist at every point in his analysis. The multiple 
dimensions of uncertainty gave rise to the ‘gap’, Kahn’s favourite and most 
compelling of notions. The concept of a ‘gap’ represented the unexpected and 
unknown possibilities that emerged from the mix of old and new weapon 
systems of both the US and the USSR at any one time.16 The ‘gap’ comprised 
either ‘knowledge’ – the other knows more of certain weapons technologies; 
‘procurement’ – the other has more weapons; or ‘operations’ – the other has 
more insight into current strategic forces. Kahn’s core problem was this: how to 
prop up hypothetical vulnerabilities, above all unknown and undetectable ones, 
with exigency. Kahn himself noted that  
 
[t]hese unnoticed operational gaps may determine the course of events and are most 
likely to cause catastrophic failures of the system, but until one is faced with a 
disastrous failure, it is most difficult to take them seriously. In general, the only way to 
find operational gaps is by intense observation of the whole system, reflection on 
unconventional possibilities, and paper and pencil studies. This means that any gaps 
that are found will look hypothetical and unreal. It will be difficult for rigid thinkers, the 
budget-minded, the ‘by assumption’ type of analyst, the loyal member of an operating 
organisation, or the partisan advocate to take such worries seriously.17  
 
Taken as a whole, Kahn’s Utopian drive was ‘simply’ to transcend every 
earthly limit through human ingenuity, resolve, and technical and scientific 
prowess. In other words, being aware of the limitations of assessments, Kahn 
nevertheless thought it possible to overcome these limitations by ‘informed 
                                                     
15
 Ghamara-Tabrizi, above n. 13, at 1. Italics added. 
16
 H. Kahn, On Thermonuclear War (Princeton, Princeton University Press 1962) at 
324. 
17
 Id., at 325. Compare with WRR report, above n. 1, at 178.  
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judgement and intuition in addition to rigorous analysis’.18 
At this point, work stemming from the Cold War touches at the heart 
of the precautionary culture we know today. Despite the fact that the WRR 
hails its own precautionary insights as novel, more than half a century later the 
work of Kahn cum suis precedes their work on multiple levels, including the 
way issues are actually phrased. Substitute the term nuclear war for, for 
example, nanotechnology, food safety, or phthalates and we have arrived in the 
21st century with its precautionary preoccupations. However, the required 
bridge between on the one hand these mid-20th century nuclear worries and 
current precautionary fears on the other hand is found in the first report to The 
Club of Rome, which posited solutions to the ‘world problematique’ of which 
nuclear armament was just one of the many issues raised.19 All the same, its 
rise to fame was deeply embedded in the gloomy Cold War atmosphere that 
vexed Western citizens to such an extent. The notions of the report, in other 
words, found the fertile soil of nuclear threat that was very much felt in the 
1960s and 1970s. 
The Limits to Growth highlighted the impact of human behaviour on 
the earth’s natural resources and the global society and tried to establish a link 
between the level of world economic growth and the extent to which our 
environmental resources are being depleted and polluted. Although The Club of 
Rome aimed to denounce the harmful effects of a productivity-oriented 
development policy, it wanted above all to demonstrate that, by pursuing 
growth, humankind was heading towards global catastrophe, one very much 
reminiscent of a nuclear doomsday. The main focus was exponential growth in 
a complex and closed world-system. The main preoccupation was the survival 
of humankind – bogged down by a political structure not deemed acceptable 
and not capable of handling the ‘world problematique’ – on a planet with 
obvious limited resources and clear political tensions, the most pronounced of 
which was the threat of nuclear war. 
The Club of Rome’s principal objective was to analyse and to 
understand – again with the aid of science-driven systems analyses run on 
computers – the basic interdependencies that link all the problems facing 
humankind across the globe, whatever the nature, very much like Kahn tried to 
do in relation to the effects of a nuclear exchange. The perception that they all 
interconnect was coined with the term ‘world problematique’. It covers a vast 
sphere of innumerable difficulties confronting humankind, such as social 
injustice, malnutrition, poverty, illiteracy, unemployment, population growth, 
                                                     
18
 Kahn, above n. 14, at 457. 
19
 D.H. Meadows and others, The Limits to Growth; A Report for the Club of Rome’s 
Project on the Predicament of Mankind (New York: Potomac Associates 1972); See 
for an analysis: J.C. Hanekamp, S.W. Verstegen and G. Vera-Navas, ‘The historical 
roots of precautionary thinking: The cultural ecological critique and “The Limits to 
Growth”’ (2005) 8 Journal of Risk Research 295. 
  
 
 
2009]  Neither acceptable nor certain 229 
 
 
and the obsession with growth, inflation, the energy crisis, monetary problems, 
and the degeneration of cities, damage to the environment, the nuclear threat, 
and political corruption.20 The term ‘world problematique’ pointed to the 
general feeling of anxiety – not just facts – felt by modern humans in the face 
of the uncertainty and complexity that came to be known as the ‘predicament of 
mankind’. 
The fundamental thesis of exponential growth in a complex and closed 
world-system resulted in the projection that no matter how the future unfolds, 
collapse is imminent unless humankind curbs its growth, both economically 
and demographically. The Club of Rome, at that time, explicitly linked the 
risks of science and technology – nuclear power – to the inevitability of 
centralised assessment and abatement strategies. The goal of these assessment 
strategies was to gauge new technology in relation to the premeditated checks 
on growth: 
 
This ignorance about the limits of the earth’s ability to absorb pollutants should be 
reason enough for caution in the release of polluting substances. The danger of reaching 
those limits is especially great because there is typically a long delay between release of 
a pollutant into the environment and the appearance of its negative effects on the 
ecosystem .… (at 89) 
Pollution generated in exponentially increasing amounts can rise past the danger point, 
because the danger point is first perceived years after the offending pollution was 
released. (at 151) 
We have felt it necessary to dwell so long on an analysis of technology because we 
have found that technological optimism is the most common and the most dangerous 
reaction to our findings from the world model. Technology can relieve the symptoms of 
a problem without affecting the underlying causes. (at 159) 21 
 
In the view of The Club of Rome science and technology needs to be assessed 
on a continuous basis in order to keep a firm grip on its development in order to 
maintain the envisioned steady-state requirements of economy and humanity in 
order to keep exponential growth at bay. The common enemy of exponential 
growth would hopefully unite humanity and thereby overcome political 
differences and nuclear destruction. 
This view on science and technology and the role of governmental 
policy-making comes together in the precautionary principle, as we know it 
today. Kahn tried to tackle all uncertainties in relation to the risks of nuclear 
war and its aftermath, while The Club of Rome, within the same historical 
setting, tried to rise above the ‘world problematique’ and resolve uncertainties 
through strong international government that opened up the possibilities for 
precautionary global assessments of science and technology. Both approaches, 
however, carry the naivety of the ostensible potential to transcend earthly limits 
                                                     
20
 A. Peccei, Human Quality (New York: Pergamom Press 1977). 
21
 Meadows and others, above n. 19. 
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through human ingenuity, resolve and technical and scientific knack. Both posit 
the centrality of science. Before we come to that, however, we will first discuss 
two examples in which precaution and science have their role to play. 
 
 
3 Risk and precaution – two examples related to human health22 
 
Chloramphenicol (CAP)23 was the first antibiotic to be produced synthetically 
on a large scale; it was first shown to be effective against typhoid and was 
subsequently used extensively against a broad variety of pathogenic micro-
organisms.24 However, it has fallen out of favour in the West due to a rare yet 
serious side effect relating to medicinal use: namely, aplastic aenemia (in which 
the bone marrow ceases to produce red and white blood cells). Moreover, 
research has indicated that it is possibly a genotoxic carcinogen, although only 
at concentrations 25 times higher than could be achieved with the highest 
medical dosages.25 Parenthetically, CAP is still very widely used in low-income 
countries because it is exceptionally cheap, and in the West it is also still 
widely used, albeit mostly in topical preparations (ointments and eye drops) for 
the treatment of bacterial conjunctivitis. CAP is banned for veterinary use. 
A broad-spectrum antibiotic, CAP was detected in 2001 in shrimp 
imported into Europe from Asian countries; the discovery was understood to be 
yet another food scandal. The initial European response was to close European 
borders to fish products, mainly shrimp, from these countries and to make 
laboratories work overtime to analyse numerous batches of imported goods for 
the presence of this antibiotic. Some European countries went so far as to have 
food products containing the antibiotic destroyed, as public health was deemed 
to be at stake. This regulatory response spilled over into other major seafood-
importing countries such as the United States. 
The legislative background to this mainly European response in part is 
to be found in Council Regulation EEC No. 2377/90 (now superseded by 
Regulation EC No. 470/2009 as of the 6th of May 2009 we will comment on 
below), which was implemented to establish maximum residue limits of 
                                                     
22
 Here we will not discuss environmental effects and occupational risks in relation 
to exposure. 
23
 J. Ehrlich and others, ‘Chloromycetin, a New Antibiotic From a Soil 
Actinomycete’ (1947) 106 Science 417. 
24
 J.C. Patel and D.D. Banker, ‘Chloramphenicol in Typhoid Fever. A Preliminary 
Report of Clinical Trial in 6 Cases’ (1949) 22 British Medical Journal 908. 
25
 IPCS–INCHEM (Chemical Safety Information from Intergovernmental 
Organisations), <http://www.inchem.org/documents/jecfa/jecmono/v33je03.htm> 
(accessed  9 April 2009);  
IPCS–INCHEM (2) (Chemical Safety Information from Intergovernmental 
Organisations), <http://www.inchem.org/documents/jecfa/jecmono/v23je02.htm> 
(accessed  9 April 2009). 
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veterinary medicinal products in foodstuffs of animal origin.26 This so-called 
‘MRL Regulation’ (maximum residue limit) introduced Community 
procedures to evaluate the safety of residues of pharmacologically active 
substances according to human food safety requirements. A pharmacologically 
active substance may be used in food-producing animals only if it receives a 
favourable evaluation. If it is considered necessary for the protection of human 
health, maximum residue limits (‘MRLs’) are established. They are the points 
of reference for setting withdrawal periods in marketing authorisations as well 
as for the control of residues in the Member States and at border inspection 
posts. 
EEC No. 2377/90 contains an Annex IV listing of pharmacologically 
active substances for which no maximum toxicological levels (Tolerable Daily 
Intake: TDI) can be fixed, either from lack of toxicological or pharmacological 
data: for example, the absence of a definable NOAEL (No Observed Adverse 
Effect Level) or LOAEL (Lowest Observed Adverse Effect Level) or because 
of genotoxic characteristics of the compound in question.27 These substances 
are consequently not allowed in the animal food-production chain. Zero 
tolerance levels are in force for Annex IV for reasons that can be classified as 
follows: 
• Lack of scientific data de facto makes the establishment of a TDI 
unfeasible; 
• The absence of a TDI and the subsequent impossibility to establish an 
MRL is understood in regulatory terms as ‘dangerous at any dose’, 
requiring zero tolerance regulation en lieu with Article 7 of Regulation 
178/2002/EC; 
• With the introduction of zero tolerance, a veterinary ban on Annex IV 
compounds (such as CAP) is in place, whereby the listed compounds, 
when producers’ compliance is achieved, would disappear from the food 
chain; 
• When zero tolerance was implemented, analytical equipment was only 
capable of detecting at the Limit of Detection (LOD) of ppm (parts per 
                                                     
26
 ‘Council Regulation (EEC) No. 2377/90 of 26 June 1990 laying down a 
Community procedure to set up maximum residue limits of veterinary medicinal 
products in foodstuffs of animal origin’ (1990) L224 Official Journal of the 
European Communities 1−8; ‘Regulation (EC) No 470/2009 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 6 May 2009 laying down Community procedures 
for the establishment of residue limits of pharmacologically active substances in 
foodstuffs of animal origin, repealing Council Regulation (EEC) No 2377/90 and 
amending Directive 2001/82/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and 
Regulation (EC) No 726/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council’ 
(2009) L152 Official Journal of the European Communities 11. 
27
 Genotoxic agents (chemicals, ionising radiation) are those capable of causing 
damage to DNA. Such damage can potentially lead to the formation of a malignant 
tumour. 
  
 
 
232 Erasmus Law Review                   [Volume 02 Issue 02 
 
million; mg per kg); nowadays LODs are at least ppb (parts per billion; μg 
per kg), obviously depending on analysed chemicals. 
No tolerable daily intake (TDI) could be established for CAP due to the 
lack of scientific information to assess its carcinogenicity and effects on 
reproduction, and because the compound showed some genotoxic activity.28 
Overall, CAP – and other Annex IV substances − should not be detected in 
food products at all, regardless of concentrations. The presence of CAP in food 
products, which can be detected by any type of analytical apparatus, is a 
violation of European law and deemed to be a threat to public health. In 
consequence, food containing the smallest amount of these residues is 
considered unfit for human consumption.  
The core regulatory framework in European food law is Regulation 
178/2002/EC, the General Food Law.29 According to this Regulation, ‘food’ (or 
‘foodstuff’) denotes ‘any substance or product, whether processed, partially 
processed or unprocessed, intended to be, or reasonably expected to be ingested 
by humans’. The scope of Regulation 178/2002/EC concerns ‘all stages of the 
production, processing and distribution of food ...’ and its general objective is 
to provide ‘a high level of protection of human life and health and the 
protection of consumers’ interests ...’. This Regulation thus sets general rules 
for all products that are brought to market. Importantly, the Regulation also 
constitutes the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) and defines the 
Authority’s task and fields of competence and authority. 
With the installation of the EFSA, precaution is specifically referred to 
as a key principle in food regulation, which broadens the explanation of the 
emergence of the CAP scandal. Especially in relation to antibiotics used in 
animal rearing, regulation is pervasive and precautionary. This is partly related 
to reducing the chronic exposure through food as much as possible, but is also 
in part due to a precautionary risk averseness. Article 7 of the EFSA describes 
the precautionary principle as follows: 
 
1. In specific circumstances where, following an assessment of available information, 
the possibility of harmful effects on health is identified but scientific uncertainty 
persists, provisional risk management measures necessary to ensure the high level 
of health protection chosen in the Community may be adopted, pending further 
scientific information for a more comprehensive risk assessment. 
 
2. Measures adopted on the basis of paragraph 1 shall be proportionate and no more 
                                                     
28
 IPCS-INCHEM (Chemical Safety Information from Intergovernmental 
Organisations). See webpage <http://www.inchem.org/documents/jecfa/jecmono/v 
33je03.htm> (accessed 3 February 2009). 
29
 ‘Regulation (EC) No 178/2002 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
28 January 2002 laying down the general principles and requirements of food law, 
establishing the European Food Safety Authority and laying down procedures in 
matters of food safety’ (2002) L31 Official Journal of the European Communities 1. 
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restrictive of trade than is required to achieve the high level of health protection 
chosen in the Community, regard being had to technical and economic feasibility 
and other factors regarded as legitimate in the matter under consideration. The 
measures shall be reviewed within a reasonable period of time, depending on the 
nature of the risk to life or health identified and the type of scientific information 
needed to clarify the scientific uncertainty and to conduct a more comprehensive 
risk assessment. 
 
The unfeasibility of zero-tolerance came to the fore as a result of the analytical 
progress made in the last two decades of the 20th century. CAP proved to be 
more ubiquitous in food – albeit at extremely low levels – than mere abuse 
could probably account for.30 Moreover, it was clear that medicinal products, 
such as CAP, were banned for veterinary use not because of inherent risks at 
low-level exposures, on the contrary. JECFA (Joint Expert Committee on Food 
Additives, FAO) could not establish an Acceptable Daily Intake for lack of 
scientific data. In Europe this was expediently and erroneously translated, 
specifically within the context of the precautionary demands in the General 
Food Law, as ‘dangerous at any dose’ and officially regarded as such. 
The regulatory and practical failure of zero-tolerance, and thereby the 
precautionary approach of food-safety, resulted in a regulatory shift.31 The 
European Commission published a decision on 11 January 2005, according to 
which CAP no longer is regulated at zero level but at the MRPL (Minimum 
Required Performance Limit) level.32 The MRPL for CAP is set at 0.3 ppb. 
Prior to this decision, MRPLs were whatever low concentration levels 
regulatory laboratories in the European Community could detect and confirm. 
With this decision MRPLs have now been given legal status in terms of explicit 
levels of concern. Regulation EC No. 470/2009, as the new regulatory standard 
for the establishment of residue limits of pharmacologically active substances 
in foodstuffs of animal origin we referred to above, specifically refers to the 
issue of LOD’s when it states in the preamble that ‘As a result of scientific and 
technical progress it is possible to detect the presence of residues of veterinary 
medicinal products in foodstuffs at ever lower levels.’ This has caused 
considerable problems that need to be amended of which this new regulation, 
superseding among others EEC No. 2377/90, is regarded as a step forward. 
Ultimately, the precautionary regulatory position and human health 
perspective proved to be untenable in the case of CAP (but also for other 
antibiotics not allowed in the food chain and part of the Annex IV such as 
                                                     
30
 J.C. Hanekamp, G. Frapporti and K. Olieman, ‘Chloramphenicol, food safety and 
precautionary thinking in Europe’ (2003) 6 Environmental Liability 209. 
31
 J.C. Hanekamp and E. Calabrese, ‘Chloramphenicol, European Legislation and 
Hormesis’ (2007) 5 Dose-Response 91. 
32
 ‘Commission decision of 11 January 2005 laying down harmonised standards for 
the testing for certain residues in products of animal origin imported from third 
countries’ (2005) L16 Official Journal of the European Union 61. 
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nitrofurans) in the face of human health requirements and, more importantly, 
progressing scientific knowledge. Indeed, the term precaution is not mentioned 
once in Regulation EC No. 470/2009.33 
A second example, and a more complicated case considering the 
interaction between policy and the advancement of scientific knowledge, 
concerns man-made chemicals in casu phthalates. Phthalates are liquid organic 
compounds added to hard polyvinyl chloride (PVC) to act as softeners or 
plasticisers. These substances make the polymer more malleable and hence 
more versatile. Due to their low cost and excellent performance characteristics, 
phthalates are found in a wide range of products that contain PVC. They are 
used for medical devices, particularly fluid containers (e.g. blood and plasma), 
tubing, and gloves, as well as household and industrial items such as wire and 
cable coating, flooring, and clothing. The vast majority of phthalates are used in 
the production of flexible PVC. The phthalates that concern us here are DEHP 
(Di(2-ethylhexyl) phthalate), DBP (Dibutyl phthalate), BBP (Butylbenzyl 
phthalate), DINP (Di-iso-nonyl phthalate), DIDP (Di-iso-decyl phthalate), and 
DNOP (Di-n-octyl phthalate). 
Overall, phthalates are known for their relative innocuous toxicological 
behaviour, both acutely and chronically. Nevertheless, they have been the focus 
of intense campaigning by environmental NGOs who brought the potential 
risks of those compounds to the fore from the 1990s onwards, as part of the 
NGO campaign against chlorine. The argument ran that if phthalates are 
manoeuvred out of the equation, the production of chlorine-containing PVC 
becomes industrially unattractive.34 In terms of toxicity young children and 
babies were, and still are, the focus of attention, obviously for emotive reasons:  
 
Children in contact with soft PVC toys may, therefore, ingest substantial quantities of 
phthalates during normal play, especially from toys specifically designed to be chewed. 
This is of concern, as phthalates are known to present a number of hazards. Although 
acute toxicity appears to be low, phthalates have been shown to cause a range of 
adverse effects in laboratory animals following longer exposure, including damage to 
the liver and kidney and, in some cases, effects on the reproductive tract ….35 
 
Despite (or rather because of) the provisional nature of scientific research 
phthalates toxicity, in December 1999, the European Commission adopted 
measures to prohibit the use of phthalate softeners in PVC toys and childcare 
                                                     
33
 Joint FAO/WHO Technical Workshop on Residues of Veterinary Drugs without 
ADI/MRL. (Bangkok, Thailand 24-26 August 2004) at 37. 
34
 R. Stringer and others, Determination of the Composition and Quantity of 
Phthalate Ester Additives in PVC Children Toys - Greenpeace Technical note 06/97 
(Exeter: Greenpeace Research Laboratories 1997). 
35
 B. Durodié, Poisonous Propaganda. Global Echoes of and Anti-Vinyl Agenda 
(Washington DC: Competitive Enterprise Institute 2000). 
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articles intended for oral use by children under three years of age.36 Specific 
reference was made to precaution:  
 
The Commission considers that, should the use of DNOP, DIDP, BBP, and DBP be 
allowed to replace DINP and DEHP, as a consequence of the prohibition of these two 
substances as plasticisers in the products in question, the exposure of children to them 
would increase and consequently the risk would be higher. Therefore, the Commission, 
adopting a precautionary approach, considers that this Decision should also apply to 
them; ….  
 
The six phthalates under scrutiny here are now regulated under Directive 
76/769/EEC.37 DEHP, DBP and BBP are not allowed beyond concentrations of 
0.1% (by mass) in toys and childcare articles. The term ‘childcare article’ 
denotes any product intended to facilitate sleep, for relaxation, hygiene, 
sucking, or the feeding of children.38 DINP, DIDP, and DNOP are only banned 
beyond the same concentrations as above in toys and childcare articles that can 
be placed in the mouth. In all other toys and childcare articles, these 
compounds are still allowed. 
In a move to ban phthalates altogether, DBP, DEHP, and BBP have 
now been put on the so-called Substances of Very High Concern (SVHC) list.39 
In the framework of the authorisation process, Member States Competent 
Authorities or the European Chemicals Agency may prepare dossiers for the 
identification of substances of very high concern. These substances are defined in 
Article 57 of Regulation (EC) No 1907/2006 (the REACH Regulation) and 
include substances that are carcinogenic, mutagenic or toxic to reproduction 
(abbreviated as CMR compounds); persistent, bioaccumulative and toxic 
                                                     
36
 ‘Commission Decision of 7 December 1999 adopting measures prohibiting the 
placing on the market of toys and childcare articles intended to be placed in the 
mouth by children under three years of age made of soft PVC containing one or 
more of the substances di-iso-nonyl phthalate (DINP), di(2-ethylhexyl) phthalate 
(DEHP), dibutyl phthalate (DBP), di-iso-decyl phthalate (DIDP), di-n-octyl 
phthalate (DNOP), and butylbenzyl phthalate (BBP)’ (1999) L31 Official Journal of 
the European Union 46. 
37
 ‘Council Directive 76/769/EEC of 27 July 1976 on the approximation of the laws, 
regulations and administrative provisions of the Member States relating to 
restrictions on the marketing and use of certain dangerous substances and 
preparations’ (1976) L262 Official Journal of the European Union 201. 
38
 ‘Directive 2005/84/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 
December 2005 amending for the 22nd time Council Directive 76/769/EEC on the 
approximation of the laws, regulations and administrative provisions of the Member 
States relating to restrictions on the marketing and use of certain dangerous 
substances and preparations (phthalates in toys and childcare articles)’ (1976) L344 
Official Journal of the European Union 40. 
39
 See <http://echa.europa.eu/consultations/authorisation/svhc/svhc_cons_en.asp> 
(accessed 9 April 2009). 
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(abbreviated as PBT compounds) or very Persistent and very Bioaccumulative 
(vPvB); identified, on a case-by-case basis, from scientific evidence as causing 
probable serious effects to human health or the environment of an equivalent 
level of concern as those above (e.g. endocrine disruption).40 It is proposed for 
DBP, DEHP, and BBP that they are identified as CMR, and we will look 
further shortly into these phthalates. 
Phthalates have been in widespread use for some 50 years, and have 
been subject to many scientific assessments in relation to their safety. The 
IARC (International Agency for Research on Cancer) has categorised BBP41 
and DEHP42 as not classifiable as to carcinogenicity (category 3), the C in the 
CMR labelling.43 It should be noted that for DEHP the evaluation has been 
downgraded from 2B (possibly carcinogenic to humans) to 3. This means that 
for two of the three phthalates on the SVHC list there is no persuasive evidence 
that they are carcinogens. There is a lack of data concerning the carcinogenicity 
of DBP. However, phthalate esters are known to induce peroxisomal 
proliferation in the liver of mice and rats, which is related to tumour 
formation.44 Many peroxisome proliferators have been shown to induce 
tumours when administered to mice and rats at high dose-levels for long 
periods, despite being non-genotoxic. It has also been shown that humans are 
insensitive or even non-responsive to peroxisome proliferators. Hence, 
carcinogenicity in humans related to phthalates’ exposure is highly 
                                                     
40
 ‘Regulation (EC) No 1907/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
18 December 2006 concerning the Registration, Evaluation, Authorisation and 
Restriction of Chemicals (REACH), establishing a European Chemicals Agency, 
amending Directive 1999/45/EC and repealing Council Regulation (EEC) No 
793/93 and Commission Regulation (EC) No 1488/94 as well as Council Directive 
76/769/EEC and Commission Directives 91/155/EEC, 93/67/EEC, 93/105/EC and 
2000/21/EC’ (2007) L136 Official Journal of the European Union 3. 
41
 IARC, Some Chemicals that Cause Tumours of the Kidney or Urinary Bladder in 
Rodents and Some Other Substances - IARC Monographs on the Evaluation of 
Carcinogenic Risks to Humans Volume 73 (Lyon: World Health Organization 1999). 
42
 IARC, Some Industrial Chemicals - IARC Monographs on the Evaluation of 
Carcinogenic Risks to Humans Volume 77 (Lyon: World Health Organization 2000). 
43
 See for the recent European assessments of the European Chemicals Bureau on 
DBP, DEHP, and BBP: European Chemicals Bureau, Dibutyl phthalate (DBP) - 
European Union Risk Assessment Report Volume 29 (Brussels: European Chemicals 
Bureau 2004); European Chemicals Bureau, Bis(2-ethylhexyl)phtalale (DEHP)-  
European Union risk Assessment Report Volume 80 (Brussels: European Chemicals 
Bureau 2008); European Chemicals Bureau Benzyl butyl phthalate (BBP) - 
European Union risk Assessment Report Volume 76 (Brussels: European Chemicals 
Bureau 2007). 
44
 Peroxisomes are single-membrane sub-cellular organelles, present in most 
eukaryotic cells and organisms. The peroxisome fulfills essential metabolic 
functions in lipid metabolism. The peroxisome also plays a key role in free radical 
detoxification. 
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implausible.45 There is now a scientific consensus that liver peroxisome 
proliferation in rodents is not relevant for human risk assessment. Concerning 
mutagenicity, the M in the CMR labeling, all three phthalates are considered to 
be non-mutagenic substances, which leaves us with reprotoxicity. 46 
Reprotoxicity seems to be the most critical of the effects of exposure to 
phthalates. Based on all the available toxicological evidence, it can be surmised 
that effects on reproduction and development are the most sensitive end-points 
on which to base the risk assessment of phthalates. Focussing on reproductive 
disorders of newborn and young adult males, these seem to be common and/or 
increasing in incidence. It has been hypothesised that these disorders may 
comprise an overall testicular dysgenesis syndrome (TDS) with a common 
origin in fetal life.47 This has been supported, to some extent, by findings in 
animal models involving fetal exposure to DBP, as well as other studies.48 
However: 
 
It is unfortunate that many people wrongly consider that the TDS hypothesis is centered 
on the idea that it is caused by exposure to environmental chemicals, in particular, 
endocrine disruptors. The original hypothesis stated that there are likely to be multiple 
causes of TDS, one of which is exposure to environmental chemicals. However, there is 
still only limited evidence to support this possibility.49 Perhaps confusion has arisen 
because the TDS hypothesis states that ‘‘endocrine disruption,’’ as encapsulated by 
altered testosterone production/action by the fetal testis, is at the center of the 
hypothesis …, but this alteration could result from any genetic, lifestyle, or 
environmental factor that causes dysgenesis. Nevertheless, as studies with DBP and 
certain other phthalates have demonstrated, environmental chemicals that can cause 
dysgenesis and/or inhibit testosterone production or action, obviously have the right 
credentials for causing TDS. Whether the human fetus is exposed to sufficient levels of 
such chemicals to result in any adverse effect remains a point for debate, and is unlikely 
to be resolved easily because of the inherent difficulties in both obtaining accurate 
chemical exposure data for the early human fetus and then relating this to clinical 
outcomes months or decades later. 50 
 
Concisely, phthalates still seem, when reviewing the scientific findings so far, 
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 R.C. Cattley and others, ‘Do Peroxisome Proliferating Compounds Pose a 
Hepatocarcinogenic Hazard to Humans?’ (1998) 27 Regulatory Toxicology and 
Pharmacology 47. 
46
 See above n. 43. 
47
 R.M. Sharpe and N.E. Skakkebaek, ‘Testicular dysgenesis syndrome: mechanistic 
insights and potential new downstream effects’ (2008) 89 Fertility and Sterility 33. 
48
 See for example E. Mylchreest and others, ‘Dose-dependent alterations in 
androgen-regulated male reproductive development in rats exposed to Di(n-butyl) 
phthalate during late gestation’ (2000) 55 Toxicological Sciences 143. 
49
 S.H. Swan and others, ‘Decrease in anogenital distance among male infants with 
prenatal phthalate exposure’ (2005) 113 Environmental Health Perspectives 1056. 
50
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innocuous chemicals, that is non-carcinogenic and non-mutagenic, with 
reprotoxicity as the potential exception for some phthalates. Furthermore, the 
latter is part of the wider context of the proposed multiple-cause testicular 
dysgenesis syndrome. This leaves us with a complex scientific issue that 
European policymakers have simply circumvented by banning phthalates from 
the realm of the consumer, despite the fact that exposure to these compounds 
from especially food (except perhaps for DBP and DEHP) is well below the 
Tolerable Daily Intake (TDI), which is an estimate of the quantity of a chemical 
in food or water which can be ingested daily over a lifetime without posing a 
significant risk to health.51 
Even though in the mid 1990s nothing was even remotely clear 
concerning the involved risks, a precautionary ban seemed appropriate as no 
scientific certainty (whatever that may be) is required (see below), or as Ewald 
proposes in relation to the function of precaution:  
 
For one must take all hypotheses into account, even and in particular the most dubious, 
one must be wide open to speculation, to the craziest imagined views. … With 
precaution, science becomes a principal of challenge. … Effectively science today 
interests us less by producing new knowledge than introducing new doubts. … [A]ll 
that can be excluded is that anything should be excluded.52  
                                                     
51
 TDIs are derived from No Observed Adverse Effect Levels (NOAEL) established 
in animal experiments. TDI= NOAEL/100 (or 200 in the case of DBP); ‘Opinion of 
the Scientific Panel on Food Additives, Flavourings, Processing Aids and Materials 
in Contact with Food (AFC) on a request from the Commission related to 
Butylbenzylphthalate (BBP) for use in food contact materials Question N° EFSA-Q-
2003-190’ (2005) 241 The EFSA Journal 1; ‘Opinion of the Scientific Panel on 
Food Additives, Flavourings, Processing Aids and Material in Contact with Food 
(AFC) on a request from the Commission related to Di-Butylphthalate (DBP) for use 
in food contact materials. Question N° EFSA-Q-2003-192’ (2005) 242 The EFSA 
Journal 1; ‘Opinion of the Scientific Panel on Food Additives,  Flavourings, 
Processing Aids and Materials in Contact with Food (AFC)  on a request from the 
Commission related to  Bis(2-ethylhexyl)phthalate (DEHP) for use in food contact 
materials Question N° EFSA-Q-2003-191’ (2005) 243 The EFSA Journal 1; 
‘Opinion of the Scientific Panel on Food Additives, Flavourings, Processing Aids 
and Materials in Contact with Food (AFC) on a request from the Commission 
related to Di-isononylphthalate (DINP) for use in food contact materials Question 
N° EFSA-Q-2003-194’ (2005) 244 The EFSA Journal 1; ‘Opinion of the Scientific 
Panel on Food Additives,  Flavourings, Processing Aids and Materials in Contact 
with Food (AFC)  on a request from the Commission related to Di-isodecylphthalate 
(DIDP) for use in food contact materials Question N° EFSA-Q-2003-195’ (2005) 
245 The EFSA Journal 1. 
52
 F. Ewald, ‘The return of Descartes’s Malicious Demon: An Out line of a 
Philosophy of Precaution’, in T. Baker and J. Simon (eds.), Embracing Risk, the 
changing culture of insurance and responsibility (Chicago: The University of 
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A decade later, the issue of reprotoxicity has come to the fore more clearly, yet 
has not been elucidated to the extent of mechanistic understanding within the 
multi-causal web of TDS. It might be argued that precaution, in hindsight, was 
warranted for the relevant phthalates and Ewald is on track with his 
understanding of precaution. However, science, as a means to choose between 
rival hypotheses about the hidden structure of the world,53 is thereby 
sidetracked and can here only serve as a retrospective confirmation or 
falsification of suspected risks, despite the fact that the latter is hardly ever 
honoured by lifting a ban or reversing precautionary legislation.54 Justice 
delayed is justice denied. Moreover, one potential example in favour of some 
precautionary legislation (the scientific jury is yet to come in with regards to 
the matter of reprotoxicity) does not exonerate the precautionary principle as 
such, far from it. It is less than evidence in favour of the expediency of 
precaution, as precaution can by definition function only ex ante that is without 
the comforts of retrospection. Retrospection is not precaution. Thus we are left 
here with the nagging question: ‘How does science work in precautionary 
culture?’ We will address this in due course. 
 
 
4 Schematising opposing views on science and risk in a cautious culture 
– towards acceptability55 
 
Worldviews shape and influence the process of scientific inquiry. Clearly, good 
science is worldview neutral, that is to say that it is not aligned to, nor does not 
support, any particular ideology, religion or worldview over another.56 Indeed, 
theories, hypotheses and concepts should be accepted in the light of 
                                                                                                                            
Chicago Press 2002) at 289. I gratefully acknowledge Tobias Arnoldussen for 
supplying me this reference. 
53
 P. Godfrey-Smith, Theory and Reality (Chicago: University of Chicago Press 
2003). 
54
 See e.g. relation to bacterial resistance and Antibiotic Growth Promotors: I. 
Phillips and others, ‘Does the use of antibiotics in food animals pose a risk to human 
health? A critical review of published data’ (2004) 53 Journal of Antimicrobial 
Chemotherapy 28; A. Bezoen, W. Van Haren and J.C. Hanekamp, Emergence of a 
Debate: AGPs and Public Health (Amsterdam: Heidelberg Appeal Foundation 
1999). 
55
 Derived from: J.C. Hanekamp and A. Bast, ‘Why RDA’s and UL’s are 
incompatible standards in the U-Shape Micronutrient Model. A philosophically 
orientated analysis of micronutrients standardisations’ (2008) 28 Risk Analysis 1639 
56
 M. Weber, On the Methodology of the Social Sciences (New York: Free Press 
1949). 
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considerations that involve transparent, and reproducible empirical evidence,57 
other (accepted) theories, and overt epistemic values such as consistency, 
simplicity, integrity, and descriptive, explanatory and predictive power only.58 
These epistemic values are essential as no theory or hypothesis can ever be 
verified completely. A scientist is rationally entitled to hold his/her beliefs in 
relation to the theories at hand with a commitment that surpasses the strength of 
the evidence (for or against).59  
 
Progress requires that most scientists get themselves in the grip of a theory which they 
aim to develop and defend, and without simply trying to dispose of it as fast as 
possible.60 
 
Securing objective knowledge therefore does not abide by the expectations, 
wishes, and demands of the global audience – citizens, NGOs, economic 
parties, governments, and so forth. Science does not easily accommodate 
majority consensus views or, for that matter, minority views. Here, the term 
objectivity involves some kind of impartiality, a lack of bias, basically 
distinguishing between two ways of forming beliefs about the hidden structure 
of the world: one way that is dependent on, say, caprice, prejudice, expectations 
(and other non-epistemic determinants); and one that avoids such influences.61 
Objectivity as defined ties into the impersonal notion of evidence as understood 
in science. If scientists try to convince the rest of the scientific community of 
the adequacy of the explanations they have put forward in order to have their 
theories accepted as a part of the corpus of scientific knowledge, then their 
evidence e cannot constitute personal reasons for believing hypothesis h. The 
scientists claim that e provides grounds for anyone to be convinced that h. 
Although evidence in science should not be relative to a person it is 
contextualised in relation to historical and epistemological circumstances 
surrounding the evidential claim. Scientists can invoke evidence the moment it 
is understood as evidence, within the context of a certain theory grasped by the 
                                                     
57
 See for a discussion thereon: L.J. Snyder, ‘Is Evidence Historical?’ in M. Curd 
and J.A. Cover (eds.), Philosophy of Science. The Central Issues (New York: W. W. 
Norton & Company 1998) at 460. 
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 M. Stenmark, How to Relate Science and Religion. A Multidimensional Model 
(Cambridge: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co. 2004). (Religion is referred to in the 
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61
 P. Godfrey-Smith, Theory and Reality (Chicago: University of Chicago Press 
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experts. Before that, evidence is still evidence yet simply not recognised as 
such.62 
With the modern use of science, risks can, and in fact are, assessed as a 
result of which public policies are constructed that add measurably to especially 
public health and safety.63 This 20th century development came about within the 
context of the tremendous increase and diffusion of wealth, which boosted 
health unequivocally in not only Western world population.64 With growing 
wealth and health came the institutions that, through science, tackled health and 
safety issues both on the short and long-term. The 20th century problems of 
poverty-induced undernourishment on account of economic depressions and 
war, for instance, proved to be powerful drivers for scientists to develop one of 
the first food standards – the RDAs (Recommended Daily Allowances) for 
vitamins and minerals – that improved overall 20th century public health 
decisively.65 
Then again, with the rise of precautionary culture, the role of science 
as a means to secure objective knowledge (as defined above) has noticeably 
changed. In modern Western societies, as material needs are met for most 
people, the logic of wealth distribution that has shaped the Western world, loses 
its immediate relevance,66 subsequently assenting to the logic of risk 
distribution.67 A society in which citizens are privileged to enjoy and to value 
their health, wealth, safety, security, and longevity paradoxically becomes 
gripped by the hazards and potential threats unleashed by the exponentially 
growing wealth-producing forces that mark the later stages of modernity.68 
Previously, during the early stages of modernity, these hazards were not 
prioritised because coping with and surmounting poverty, hunger, and disease 
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 Snyder, above n. 57. 
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 R.C. Barnard, ‘A New Approach to Risk Assessment Integrating Scientific 
Evaluation and Economic Assessment of Costs and Benefits’ (1996) 24 Regulatory 
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 J.M. Hollander, The Real Environmental Crisis. Why Poverty, Not Affluence, Is 
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were the overriding societal interests. As Beck asserts:  
 
The driving force in the class society can be summarized in the phrase: I am hungry! 
The collective disposition of the risk society, on the other hand, is expressed in the 
statement: I am afraid!69  
 
Therefore, in contemporary post-modern society the goal of affluence yields to 
that of life-term (indeed inter-generational) safety.70 
Concomitantly, in economically and industrially highly developed 
societies, diverse regulation of a mainly precautionary nature71 has found its 
way into many areas.72 The shift of societies to a culture of precaution 
galvanises citizens’ insistence on advance proof that activities and products 
pose no long-term risk to human and environmental health.73 Scientific 
research and regulation caters for this ‘risk management of everything’.74 Lest 
we forget, there is a strong desire among mass-public citizens in the Western 
world to believe that they live in, and need to live in a world made predictable 
by science. There is an equally strong desire among elite citizens working in 
the media, business, and government to appear to be doing the right thing by 
ritualistically consulting seemingly au fait analysts and consultants 
(technocratic, scientific, religious or otherwise) from well-known institutes in 
order to ‘grasp the future’.75 Science as a result has become heavily politicised 
and commercialised. The increasing public and political focus on safety, 
security, and predictability propels scientific research in growing and disparate 
fields, initiating, for lack of a better term, the ‘scientification’ (or perhaps the 
objectification) of risk and uncertainty.76 
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Still, scientists are quite aware of the limitations of scientific 
knowledge. As mentioned, verification within science is beyond our 
capabilities. Indeed, examples abound in which science comes up with 
surprising new insights that overturn old ideas and concepts. In the celebrated 
BBC documentary The Ascent of Man, Jacob Bronowski memorably assessed 
what science in fact is: 
 
… Science is a very human form of knowledge. We are always at the brink of the 
known; we always feel forward for what is to be hoped. Every judgement in science 
stands on the edge of error and is personal. Science is a tribute to what we can know, 
although we are fallible. In the end, the words were said by Oliver Cromwell: ‘I 
beseech you, in the bowels of Christ, think it possible you may be mistaken’. 
 
When we expand our demands for safety, as precautionary culture does, into a 
by definition unknown distant future, the confines of even our best scientific 
knowledge will surface progressively more poignantly. Here we enter the realm 
of uncertainty, and cross over from modernity to post-modernity:  
 
Because we don’t drop dead [because of the implementation of a technology; authors], 
we allow ourselves to draw our boundaries of consideration much narrower than they 
should be. Boundaries over space and time are nearly always much narrower than the 
boundaries that include the cause. When the boundaries are made appropriately larger, 
they embrace more of our ignorance and more ambiguity ….77 
 
Those who entertain seriously the conviction that science (‘the boundaries of 
consideration’) should transgress its fundamental confines of space and time in 
order to address the many perceived long-term risks, need quite a robust belief 
in what science can and must deliver. On the one hand, they can find obvious 
support in the fact that citizens of the Western world have experienced 
increasing wealth, safety, security, and longevity because of science and 
technology. On the other hand, however, a high level of confidence regarding 
what science is supposed to deliver is offset by a high level of scepticism with 
regard to what science cannot and should not do. In modern society, scepticism 
about science’s capacity to secure objective knowledge, illustrated by the 
erosion of the idea or ideal of autonomous knowledge and autonomous law,78 
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lent aid to the shift to the notion of inter-subjective knowledge.79 It is merely a 
matter of degree to claim that all knowledge is related to interests and power.80 
‘Finding the truth’ has throughout the 20th century been increasingly 
accompanied by ‘winning the power struggle’.81 New knowledge always 
carries the potential risk that it will upset agreed-upon concepts, policies and 
power structures based on ‘established’ scientific knowledge. Science thus 
finds itself between Scylla and Charybdis. On the one hand it is looked at as the 
discerning field of authority and advice, and not without cause. On the other 
hand it is regarded as being the all-pervasive origin of many risks that might 
materialise in a distant future. 
Part of the scientific community has sought to respond to this dilemma 
and thereby helped shape the approach of acceptability.82 Because of their 
likely positive social and environmental outcomes, for instance, particular 
directions in scientific and social inquiry should be favoured.83 Put differently, 
scientific inquiry, at the same time, should be explanatory, normative, practical 
and self-reflexive. Ideally, the acceptability approach should empower people 
with capacities to reason critically and to assess sharply the conflicting 
(scientific) argumentations that play an important role in their lives.84 The UK 
government’s inquiry into the purported adverse health effects of mobile 
phones, concluded that in future ‘non-peer reviewed papers and anecdotal 
evidence should be taken into account’ as part of the process for reaching 
decisions on these matters.85  
The modern scientific effort to secure objective knowledge in 
precautionary culture is transformed into the post-modern goal of acceptability 
and strategies of, for instance, safety through governance, as it is thought that 
society is continually threatened by numerous unknown dangers.  At this 
juncture science cannot secure objective knowledge as we are dealing with 
remote probabilities that might (or might not) materialise in a distant future. A 
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culture of fear has emerged.86 The modern approach centres on risks that can be 
assessed more or less confidently, and policies, which aim to prevent major 
health problems, will include the majority of the population, as the history of 
RDAs has shown.87 Conversely, the more post-modern approach deals with 
health risks that are much more explicitly viewed as uncertain, as underlined by 
the latest WRR report, and are explicated in the examples we discussed above. 
Ewald emphasizes this with the notion that  
 
[p]recaution starts when decisions must be made by reason of and in the context of 
scientific uncertainty. Decisions are therefore made not in a context of certainty, nor 
even available knowledge, but of doubt, suspicion, premonition, foreboding, challenge, 
mistrust, fear, and anxiety.88 
 
In what way then is precaution beneficial here? It seems that the deemed 
benefits lie in managing, or even perhaps containing, uncertainty. This was the 
aspect that disturbed Kahn the most in his attempts to frame the contours of 
nuclear war, and seems to be at the core of what we now call sustainability that 
is  
 
the ability of humanity to ensure that it meets the needs of the present without 
compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs. Sustainable 
development is not a fixed state of harmony, but rather a process of change in which the 
exploitation of resources, the direction of investments, the orientation of technological 
development and institutional changes are made consistent with future as well as 
present needs.89  
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Perhaps, sustainability should best be understood as the attempt to end 
uncertainty about humanity’s future in a world ‘tainted’ by human hands. 
 
 
5 Sustainability or the ‘end of uncertainty’ 
 
The precautionary principle seeks to advance the timing and to tighten the 
stringency of ex ante regulation. On these sliding scale dimensions, regulation 
is ‘more precautionary’ when it intercedes earlier and/or more rigorously in 
order to preclude uncertain future adverse consequences of particular human 
activities.90 The axiom put forward in the precautionary principle is for a given 
human activity that may have a specified or unspecified effect on the 
environment and/or human health, the precautionary principle is supposed to 
designate the remedy.91 Precaution is viewed as the core principle for achieving 
a ‘sustainable’ (global) society where the risks and uncertainties, which ill-
considered scientific and technological developments might present for 
contemporary and future generations, are contained. The hopes are that the 
precautionary principle will generate a new law system with universal girth that 
will protect the present and future generations against the environmental and 
health risks associated with the highly and technologically evolved production 
methods and consumption patterns. Precaution therefore is regarded as the 
lodestar on the road to sustainability. 
The Bergen Ministerial Declaration on Sustainable Development in 
the ECE Region of 1990, for example, states that ‘In order to achieve 
sustainable development, policies must be based on the precautionary principle. 
Environmental measures must anticipate, prevent and attack the causes of 
environmental degradation …’.92 Prudence is required to prevent damage to the 
world’s ecosystems, in order to ensure that the environment has a good future 
and that it should not be further shaken by recourse to technologies whose 
effects are controversial or uncertain. Technology that might be inimical to 
sustainable development should perhaps not be used at all, or used only 
moderately, or be subject to certain safeguards. 
Now, sustainability is not an easy goal to define or indeed to 
comprehend. Many societies have been sustainable only by regular adaptation. 
In this context, the environmental historian McNeill notes that history offers 
many examples of apparently unsustainable societies that nevertheless endured 
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for long periods of time.93 The World Commission on Environment and 
Development, named after its chairperson the then prime minister of Norway 
Gro Harlem Brundtland, has defined sustainability most famously (see above). 
However, many more definitions are in existence particularly adding to the 
complexity of the issue.94 
In the past, as is the common perspective, the impact of human 
societies on the physical world is regarded as relatively limited. The 
unprecedented scientific and technological developments of the last two 
centuries have made it possible for man to damage not only large areas of the 
globe we inhabit, but the globe itself.95 However, the negative effects of these 
developments on human health or the environment are not always apparent at 
once. Few would have predicted a century ago what the motorcar has done to 
change the world, or that asbestos might have fatal effects on factory workers. 
When King James the Sixth of Scotland (and First of England) published his 
‘Counterblaste to Tobacco’, his was probably a minority opinion. Nowadays, 
the medical profession worldwide, not to mention the WHO, would echo his 
condemnation of smoking as  
 
a custome lothsome to the eye, hatefull to the Nose, harmefull to the braine, dangerous 
to the Lungs, and in the blacke stinking fume thereof, neerest resembling the horrible 
Stigian smoke of the pit that is bottomelesse.96 
 
Precaution and sustainability are closely related to each other. One could argue 
that they are both sides of the same coin. As such, the precautionary principle 
impresses upon us a moral obligation to take care of the environment, of 
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humankind, our children, and our children’s children. Indeed, as stated by the 
European Commission:  
 
The dimension of the precautionary principle goes beyond the problems associated with 
a short or medium-term approach to risks. It also concerns the longer run and the well-
being of future generations.97 
 
Similarly, the World Commission states that ‘hope for the future is conditional 
on decisive political action now to begin managing environmental resources to 
ensure both sustainable human progress and human survival’.98 
Thus, uncertainty about the future of us humans and the planet needs to 
be tackled in a manner that is sustainable. Precaution is the farsighted means to 
attain a level of certainty about our way of life and how to make adjustments in 
accordance with this sustainable perspective. Whether or not this is at all 
feasible hinges on the viability of the precautionary principle. This viability is 
the subject of the next paragraph. 
 
 
6 Neither acceptable nor delimiting uncertainty – a critique of the logic 
of precaution 
 
The justifications advanced by proponents of the precautionary principle for 
adopting its prescriptions revolve around the inevitable limitations in our ability 
to predict which activities will cause severe, irreversible harms.99 Uncertainty 
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abounds when human activities are reviewing. Rolston remarks that  
 
[w]ith ever higher technology, it seems that our power to produce changes overshoots 
increasingly our power to foresee all the consequences. … In a way our ignorance 
outpaces our knowledge; thus, we are asking for trouble unless we slow down the 
introduction of potentially more potent novel changes with adequate pretesting. The 
unforeseen consequences outnumber the foreseen consequences, and the bad 
unforeseen consequences greatly outnumber the good unforeseen consequences. 
Serendipity is rare in high technology.100 
 
The logical difficulty of precaution is the fact that any true node in a decision 
tree must at the very least have two branches: we may either undertake a 
certain action or we may refrain from undertaking it.101 Each of these choices –
action and inaction – entails consequences, both foreseen and unforeseen. Both 
carry uncertainties. However, it is crucial to remember that a decision not to 
undertake an action is as much an action as is the undertaking of it. As such, 
not acting opens us to the risks of sins of omission: 
 
A legal parallel may be instructive here. In the context of sales transactions, a seller 
who fails to disclose to the buyer certain known and relevant information, but who has 
otherwise been truthful, harms the buyer. The seller has not misrepresented a material 
fact, there is no fraud in this transaction. Rather, the failure to disclose the information 
itself is the harm. The harm comes from an inaction on the part of the seller, not from a 
bad action. Inaction no less than action carries with it the potential for harm.102 
 
So we are confronted with a Catch-22. To which choice of the very simple two-
option node in the decision tree should we apply precaution? Each branch, 
obviously, carries with it certain foreseen risks along with certain unforeseen 
risks. But as the unforeseen risks for each branch may well be devastating, how 
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can we decide which branch to take?103 The precautionary principle therefore 
does not provide any guidance whatsoever. As Sunstein explains: 
 
The real problem with the Precautionary Principle … is that it is incoherent; it purports 
to give guidance, but it fails to do so, because it condemns the very steps that it requires. 
The regulation that the principle requires always gives rise to risks of its own – and 
hence the principle bans what it simultaneously mandates. I therefore aim to challenge 
the Precautionary Principle not because it leads in bad directions, but because read for 
all it is worth, it leads in no direction at all. The principle threatens to be paralyzing, 
forbidding regulation, inaction, and every step in between. It provides help only if we 
blind ourselves to many aspects of risk-related situations and focus on a narrow subset 
of what is at stake. That kind of self-blinding is what makes the principle seem to give 
guidance; ….104 
 
The precautionary principle therefore engenders an impossible arrangement, as 
risks are on all sides of the societal and regulatory equation. To ‘decide on a 
safe course’, in this case precautionary inaction, results in the formation of 
other and new (and most probably unforeseen) risks, which, by definition, 
evokes a secondary precautionary response, ad infinitum. In other words, even 
if an effect of human activity is catastrophic, that fact alone cannot rationally 
compel us to impose a precautionary remedy unless we also know that the 
remedy itself does not lead to catastrophic results. Obviously we do not know 
the effect of the precautionary remedy, since we do not know the effect against 
which precautionary regulation is targeted. It is one thing to be aware of a 
certain detrimental or destructive phenomenon; for example cancer; it is quite 
another thing to know this phenomenon to be an effect of, say, exposure to 
certain man-made chemicals. 
Thus, even if we grant that the phenomenon of low-level exposures to 
these chemicals could potentially result in, for instance, the horrifying prospect 
of human extinction (as we are all exposed to, say, numerous reprotoxic 
phthalates, which in the long run could impair our reproductive capabilities), it 
does not follow that we must impose a precautionary remedy, much less that 
we should disregard the probability that the dreaded effect actually could 
materialise. Why? Because it could be that the remedy will bring about an 
outcome that also leads to human extinction: 
 
Consider a wild story. The Kyoto Treaty is ratified by the U.S. Senate and signed into 
law by President Bush. All signatories to the treaty abide strictly to its demands. A 
global economic depression results. Massive social unrest ensues. Totalitarian 
dictatorships arise in Russia and the United States. War starts and nuclear weapons are 
launched by both sides. The predictions of the nuclear winter model prove to be 
                                                     
103
 Id. 
104
 C.R. Sunstein, Laws of Fear: Beyond the Precautionary Principle (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press 2005) at 14. 
  
 
 
2009]  Neither acceptable nor certain 251 
 
 
perfectly accurate. Within five years, cockroaches rule the planet. The moral? We had 
better not do anything about greenhouse gas emissions.105 
 
Obviously, this line of reasoning and the subsequent conclusion seem absurd. 
As it stands, however, the precautionary principle does not exclude this 
scenario or any other apocalypse, as it fails to prohibit any catastrophic 
possibilities from its realm of application. To reiterate Ewald’s point: ‘… all 
that can be excluded is that anything should be excluded.’ The implementation 
of the precautionary principle only requires the mere possibility of catastrophe 
(as proposed in the strong versions of the precautionary principle), and since 
mere possibilities are easy to construct and limited only by the imagination, any 
application of the precautionary principle will be confronted with a fatal 
problem: the reasoning it employs can be used to generate a demand for a 
contradictory course of action. To reiterate the point made in The Final 
Declaration of the First European ‘Seas at Risk’ Conference Annex I (see 
above):  
 
… If the “worst case scenario” for a certain activity is serious enough then even a small 
amount of doubt as to safety of that activity is sufficient to stop it taking place. 
 
The precautionary principle speaks as though it is an exogenous panacea for 
environmental and social ills. But precautionary regulation is not an exogenous 
solution; it is itself an endogenous (i.e. societal embedded) and fallible human 
activity. Indeed, it is a form of technology, and as such it can create risks, and 
ones risks that are as real as the risks it is targeted against. The overall problem 
is flawed human institutions (whether economic, bureaucratic, or otherwise), 
perhaps most adequately referring to the fundamental (biblical) notion that 
humans are sinful creatures and are incapable of truly overseeing (or wanting to 
see) all consequences of their actions.106 Indeed, ‘… no one can know 
beforehand the exact consequences of any portfolio of policy measures, …’ as 
Prins and Rayner observe in relation to the Kyoto Protocol.107 And they are 
both by no means skeptics when considering climate change; far from it. 
Indeed, according to the burden of proof approach, advocates of 
precautionary regulation would be required to demonstrate the absence of 
counterproductive (catastrophic) effects resulting from the effects of the 
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precautionary regulation itself. The practical consequences of regulation are 
quite uncertain and could well be catastrophic. Advocates of precaution 
typically could not meet this burden. The precautionary principle would 
preclude further regulation or, as stated above, would require a subsequent 
precautionary response and so on and so forth.108 Therefore, the precautionary 
principle is self-defeating. 
With precaution we enter a vicious circle of (scientific) uncertainty. 
The uncertainty of harm requires a precautionary curtailment or ban of a certain 
activity, which in future might be resolved by scientific research. But the 
possibility of scientific certainty is precisely the thing that is here under dispute: 
what level of ‘certainty’ is required to satisfy the precautionary requirements? 
As the European Commission states in its communication on precaution:  
 
Hence, … measures adopted in application of a precautionary principle when the 
scientific data are inadequate, are provisional and imply that efforts be undertaken to 
elicit or generate the necessary scientific data. It is important to stress that the 
provisional nature is not bound up with a time limit but with the development of 
scientific knowledge.109  
 
Thus, a precautionary ban will most likely have an ‘enduring temporality’. 
In all this lies the fundamental epistemological problem facing those 
proposing to use the precautionary principle: it appears to commit us to taking 
the branch of inaction (‘When in doubt, don’t.’), despite the obvious associated 
problems, which we have explained above. As the example of Manson shows, 
there is absolutely no reason to believe that the branch of inaction will be any 
less destructive than the branch of action. Recognising this, we find ourselves 
paralysed into inaction by indecision, and thus into the acceptance of unknown, 
unforeseen, and potentially unacceptable risks. ‘The precautionary principle’s 
prescription for quietism actually ends up committing us to a nonrational, and 
probably irrational, embracing of unforeseen risks. Surely this cannot be 
right’.110 
The hidden value underneath the debate on risk, uncertainty, and 
precaution seems to be ‘preferring inaction’ through, say, a Principle of 
Preferring Inaction (PPI).111 Ultimately, with precaution, the search for safety in 
stasis is expounded.112 The PPI is an additional assumption, in no way entailed 
by precaution itself and may actually result in violations thereof should inaction 
turn out to be more damaging than action. Proponents of the value of 
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precaution have yet to adopt clearly or defend at all the PPI. In view of its 
hidden character, this is unlikely to happen. Adherence to the so-called ‘cultural 
ecological critique’ of green thinking seems to underscore the PPI.113 The 
generally acceptable ‘green’ perspective generates the ideological milieu in 
which the precautionary principle operates and thrives. As Mckinney and 
Hammer Hill note: 
 
… Assuming a smoothly functioning and balanced ecosystem, preferring inaction to 
action may make sense. At that first node on a decision tree, standing in the Garden, we 
may well counsel Adam and Eve not to eat. However, the significant environmental 
problems which tend to be the focus of current sustainability debates are problems of 
highly industrialized or newly industrializing societies. In fact, it is precisely the 
industrialization of a society that tends to generate these problems. We have a long, and 
often less than sterling, history of environmental actions, and we cannot reasonably act 
as if we faced an environmental tabula rasa. 
Using the notion of environmental equilibrium to support the application of 
the PPI to current issues in environmental ethics commits, from a phenomenological 
point of view, a fundamental error − it ignores the facticity of Dasein. One of 
Heidegger’s (1962) fundamental insights into the nature of human being is that people 
find themselves in situations that often are not of their own making, but which serve as 
inescapable frameworks for their actions. This is the facticity, or the thrownness, of 
Dasein into the world. The situations into which Dasein is thrown, whether or not 
Dasein bears any responsibility for the creation of them, both open and foreclose certain 
courses of action as realistic possibilities for Dasein’s being in the world. And each 
situation has its own history, its own background, against which the horizon of 
possibilities opens up. But for a full appreciation of possibilities that are present to hand 
in a situation, Dasein must recognize and understand the historical basis of the situation. 
In the context of environmental actions, we cannot ignore the historical roots of the 
decision tree between whose branches we today must choose .…114 
  
The epistemologically compelling and ultimately essential ethical question still 
remains to be resolved: ‘How are we to act in the face of uncertainty?’ Are we 
then to return to the flawed positivistic concept of evidentialism as e.g. 
Bertrand Russell, for instance, would have it?  
 
We ought to give to every proposition which we consider as nearly as possible that 
degree of credence which is warranted by the probability it acquires from the evidence 
known to us.115  
 
or as William Clifford stated in his ‘Ethics of Belief’: ‘To sum up: it is wrong 
always, everywhere, and for anyone, to believe anything upon insufficient 
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evidence’.116 Surely not. This would bring us nowhere: that is, in neither 
direction when considering the two-node decision tree. In light of 
evidentialism, we will always have insufficient evidence, for either node.117  
Evidentialism will not illuminate our uncertainty nor will it increase our 
knowledge of the world we live in. It will only spawn some form of scientism, 
that is the defective notion (we cannot explore here) that science alone is 
deemed to be capable of elucidating and resolving genuine human problems 
(poverty, social inequity, global warming, pollution, food safety, and etceteras) 
whereby all human affairs can be reduced to science.118  
Nevertheless,  
 
[c]hemicals, unlike persons, are not innocent until proven guilty but suspect until 
proven innocent. So the burden of proof shifts, and it is now up to the industrialists to 
dispatch it. …119  
 
Such an approach as proposed by Rolston, and embraced by most proponents 
of precaution, would inadvertently and paradoxically spawn some form of 
precautionary evidentialism, which indeed underscores too high a level of 
confidence regarding what science is supposed to deliver. The precautionary 
evidentialist challenge would now not be to prove the presence of some form of 
risk, to which proponents of precaution rightfully protested, but to prove the 
absence of any and all risks! Precautionary quietism subsequently develops, as 
science can never rise to the occasion of precautionary evidentialism. Proving a 
negative is a probatio diabolica that is impossible. Science and technology 
cannot be concerned with testing every possible consequences of a given 
action. The WRR’s proposition to maximise the assessment and management 
of uncertainty in relation to human activities is not only untenable but in fact 
unacceptable. Science is limited, and can only deal with plausible 
consequences: ‘It localizes its predictions by conjoining the generalization with 
a set of auxiliary assumptions (A)’.120 Rolston remarks that businesses must ‘… 
not use complexity to dodge responsibility. Environmental causal links are 
multiple, incremental and long term. Their discovery is slow’.121 
The proposed solution to complexity and ‘the lack of vision in framing 
the set A’ is to assume the worst case and subsequently seek to avoid it. 
Unfortunately, this takes us no closer to safe and accurate decision-making than 
does assuming the best case. If policy-makers are to prescribe action, 
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sustainable development policies require the precautionary principle in order to 
prescribe sustainable actions; then the precautionary principle renders policy-
makers helpless, bearing in mind the infinite number of unforeseen detrimental 
outcomes. In view of this epistemological conundrum, to ‘err on the side of 
safety’ is impossible. It is neither acceptable nor will it reduce uncertainty with 
regard to our actions. With the sustainable perspective and its precautionary 
implementation, a history of humankind, however flawed and faltering, is 
denied, for the benefit of present and future generations. The tabula rasa of 
Utopia lures, although this discussion is for another time and another place.122 
What is left then is to tie the different strands of the debate together. 
 
 
7 Some concluding remarks 
 
Different threads in the precautionary tale have been woven together in this 
contribution. We first showed that the latest take of the WRR on precaution, 
although labelled as novel, could easily (sic) be traced to the work of Herman 
Kahn some half a century ago. Together with the ‘extension’ of The Limits to 
Growth, the precautionary tale started to grow in the Western world in which 
uncertainty was one of the core determinants.123 The role of science in society 
changed therewith from a means of securing objective knowledge (in the 
impartial sense) to producing acceptable results.124 Precaution, with the aid of 
science thus understood, is regarded as the way out of this conundrum en route 
to a sustainable future. 
Therefore, the precautionary principle, as the core tenet of sustainable 
development, must have a solid and intelligible logical and epistemic 
foundation upon which to build. This foundation is problematic, to say the 
least. Thereby, the concept of sustainable development is problematic. If the 
moral obligation to avoid the potential harm of acting now and especially in the 
future leads us into inaction, clearly, there will also be those situations where 
the obligation to avoid harm from inaction must lead us into action. In both 
cases, the means by which we assess the consequences of our ‘actions’ (broadly 
construed as action and inaction) are the same. Are we to act in order to avoid 
the harmful consequences of inaction? Are we to refrain from action in order to 
avoid the harmful consequences of action? Methodologically speaking, the 
decisions are equally problematic, given the nature of inductive inference and 
the historical essence of science and technology. As a result, sustainable 
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development and its carrying principle of precaution, become highly 
problematic, and quite possibly unfeasible, in the face of these logical, 
epistemological and historical difficulties. 
Science does not supply direction in terms of precautionary conduct. 
Precautionary policies in relation to banned veterinary medication brought 
forth, in the light of growing scientific and technological capabilities, the 
potential to detect in the range of parts per billion, which are to be regarded as 
toxicological insignificant. Yet from a precautionary perspective the involved 
risks cannot be excluded, as it fails to prohibit any catastrophic possibilities 
from its realm of its application. Only when Annex IV substances are 
completely absent from food (at zero concentration) the risks are deemed, 
obviously, completely absent. Technological analytical innovation had become 
the driver of zero tolerance policies and subsequently and not surprisingly 
generated a serious regulatory impasse.125 Phthalates, in use for more than 50 
years, have never been known for their toxicity, despite extensive scientific 
reviewing. The 1999-ban of a number of phthalates was inspired by 
precautionary sentiments, predictably in the face of scientific uncertainty 
regarding the potential risks. Although ambiguity in relation to reprotoxic risks 
of exposure remains, the mutagenic and carcinogenic nature of phthalates have 
been dismissed, for the present (in light of our current knowledge). However, 
as the protagonists of precaution like to stress: absence of proof is not proof of 
absence, whereby the vicious precautionary circle is institutionalised. 
Thus scientific ambiguity and the purported acceptability requisite 
have proven to be ideal a priori tenets to shape industrial and societal 
development to political needs, paradoxically with the help of a precautionary 
shaped evidentialism.126 However: 
 
… no single all-purpose number … expresses ‘acceptable risk’ for a society. Values 
and uncertainties are an integral part of every acceptable problem. As a result, there are 
no value-free processes for choosing between risky alternatives. The search for an 
‘objective method’ is doomed to failure and may blind the searchers to the value-laden 
assumptions they are making .... Not only does each approach fail to give a definitive 
answer, but it is predisposed to representing particular interests and recommending 
particular solutions. Hence, choice of a method is a political decision with a distinct 
message about who should rule and what should matter.127 
 
The ‘scientification’ of risk and uncertainty, therefore, is a feeble disguise for 
the fact that precaution empowers bureaucracy. 
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Raising the acceptability benchmark in the context of guaranteeing 
safety subverts the aim to secure objective knowledge. It is always possible to 
assume that a particular risk exists and subsequently project more stringent 
policies, yet impossible to prove or assume that any and all possible risks are 
absent. As a case in point for the latter, Weinberg pointed out that a study 
designed to detect an increased mutation frequency of about 0.5% following 
low dose radiation (at a 95% confidence level) would involve an experiment 
requiring 8 billion mice.128 Thus, the search for acceptable levels of exposure 
related to a high level of safety results in regulatory itineraries that persistently 
drive ever-increasing scientific input and output and additional and more 
stringent regulation. This development, in my view, fuels ‘doubt beyond 
reasonable proof’ licensing open-ended policy structures and thereby raising 
the spectre of relativism. ‘… then we fall prey to the vicissitudes of popularity 
…, primarily in the form of ad populum arguments’.129 
 
Science is tentative, exploratory, questioning, largely learned by doing. One of the 
world’s leading physicists was famous for opening his introductory classes by saying 
that it doesn’t matter what we cover, but what we discover, maybe something that will 
challenge prevailing beliefs if we are fortunate.130  
 
Incontrovertibly then, the most critical and most volatile problems cannot be 
solved without the effective marshalling of expert scientific knowledge and 
judgment. Securing objective knowledge about safety, health, and the like, 
despite the inherent and attendant value judgments, pre-eminently remains a 
scientific task, and a challenge for and to the precautionary future. This is 
attainable only if the scientific community is perceptive of its own values and 
frames, and is not aligned to a particular worldview, including the 
precautionary worldview. In light thereof, abandoning the accepted idea of 
assessing and managing uncertainty is the only option, as Ghamari-Tabrizi 
concluded on her work of Herman Kahn:  
 
… the human will is not the author of the universe …. The living world is no modular 
tool or resource for extraction. The error is just here. … The nonhuman world, that 
alarmingly uncivil reality, is not molded by wishes, may yet be uncoercible, may yet 
stand fast against resolve. … Slighting this, Kahn lunged into a body of fog, winning 
victory from no resistance at all. This is kitsch, a stroke against nothing.131  
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